Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma  by Hilbe, Christian et al.
Games and Economic Behavior 92 (2015) 41–52Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Games and Economic Behavior
www.elsevier.com/locate/geb
Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner’s 
dilemma✩
Christian Hilbe a,∗, Arne Traulsen b, Karl Sigmund c,d
a Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, United States
b Department of Evolutionary Theory, Max-Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, 24306 Plön, Germany
c Faculty of Mathematics, University of Vienna, Nordbergstrasse 15, 1090 Vienna, Austria
d International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Schlossplatz 1, 2361 Laxenburg, Austria
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t
Article history:
Received 16 August 2013
Available online 30 May 2015
JEL classiﬁcation:
C72
C73
Keywords:
Repeated games
Zero-determinant strategies
Cooperation
Reciprocity
Extortion
Within the class of memory-one strategies for the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, we 
characterize partner strategies, competitive strategies and zero-determinant strategies. If 
a player uses a partner strategy, both players can fairly share the social optimum; but a 
co-player preferring an unfair solution will be penalized by obtaining a reduced payoff. 
A player using a competitive strategy never obtains less than the co-player. A player using 
a zero-determinant strategy unilaterally enforces a linear relation between the two players’ 
payoffs. These properties hold for every strategy used by the co-player, whether memory-
one or not.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC 
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
In a one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game, the two players have to choose between C and D (to cooperate resp. to 
defect). Following the notation in Rapoport and Chammah (1965), the payoff matrix is given by
C D
C R,R S,T
D T,S P,P
(1)
in which the four payoff variables represent the reward for mutual cooperation R , the sucker’s payoff S , the temptation to 
defect T , and the punishment for mutual defection P . Payoffs satisfy the inequalities T > R > P > S , such that defection is 
a dominant strategy, but mutual cooperation is preferred over mutual defection. In addition to these inequalities, we shall 
also assume that
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such that mutual cooperation is unanimously preferred from a group perspective.1 In such cases, experimental evidence 
suggests that many players want to achieve conditional cooperation. They are willing to play C , provided the co-player also 
plays C (see, e.g., Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; Yamagishi et al., 2005). However, short of a commitment device, this cannot 
be ensured. Thus, players either have to trust their co-player, or else use their dominant strategy.
The situation is different for an iterated PD game (IPD). Diverse ‘folk theorems’ state that any feasible and individually 
rational outcome can be sustained as an equilibrium if the probability δ of a further round is suﬃciently large. Such out-
comes can be enforced in various ways, and under a wide range of circumstances (see, e.g., Friedman, 1971; Aumann, 1981;
Aumann and Shapley, 1994; Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986; Kalai, 1990; Myerson, 1991; Mailath and Olszewski, 2011). If sub-
jects can make binding commitments ahead of the game, then analogous results can be obtained even for one-shot games 
(Kalai et al., 2010).
Experimental research has uncovered considerable heterogeneity in human social preferences (Colman, 1995; Kagel and 
Roth, 1997; Camerer, 2003), and a similar variety can be found among the strategies that are played in the IPD (Milinski 
and Wedekind, 1998; Dal Bó and Fréchette, 2011; Fudenberg et al., 2012). Players who in the one-shot game would opt for 
conditional cooperation should be willing to engage in ‘partner’ strategies. Such strategies aim for an average payoff R per 
round, which necessarily provides the same payoff R for the co-player; should the co-player not go along, however, then 
the co-player’s payoff will be less than R . Thus, a partner strategy appeals to the co-player’s self-interest in order to further 
the own self-interest. It is fair, and provides an incentive for the co-player to also be fair. In contrast, some players tend to 
view their co-player as a rival, rather than a partner. The main purpose, for such competitive players, is to do better, or at 
least as well as the other player. A preference for dominating the co-player is particularly likely in the context of a game, 
which often has antagonistic connotations.
The aim of the present manuscript is two-fold: ﬁrst, we are going to characterize all memory-one strategies which are 
either competitive, or partner strategies in the sense above. We emphasize that players using such strategies can enforce 
their preferences against all comers, since we impose no restrictions on the strategies used by the co-players. For partner 
strategies, the corresponding results in the limiting case of an IPD without discounting have been obtained within the last 
two years (Akin, 2013; Stewart and Plotkin, 2013, 2014). Here, we are going to extend the theory by allowing for discount 
factors δ ≤ 1 (which may either be interpreted as the constant continuation probability of having another round, or as the 
players’ common discount rate on future payoff streams). The recent progress was stimulated by the unexpected discovery 
of so-called zero-determinant (ZD) strategies, a class of memory-one strategies enforcing a linear relationship between the 
payoffs of the two players, irrespective of the co-player’s strategy (Press and Dyson, 2012). In particular, ZD strategies can 
ﬁx the co-player’s payoff to an arbitrary value between P and R; or ensure that the own ‘surplus’ (over the maximin value 
P ) is twice as large as the co-player’s surplus; etc. Also for ZD strategies, we are going to extend the theory to the case 
when future payoffs are discounted, and δ ≤ 1.
The nature of our results is somewhat different from usual treatments of repeated games. Our article does not focus on 
equilibrium behavior (in particular, we do not aim to explore which payoffs rational players can achieve). Instead, we deﬁne 
some interesting properties that a player’s strategy may have (e.g., being competitive); and then we are going to characterize 
all memory-one strategies that have the respective property (independent of whether such a strategy can be sustained as 
an equilibrium). Thereby, we do not make any assumptions on the behaviors of the co-players (e.g., we do not require them 
to play best responses, or to follow a predeﬁned equilibrium path). Nevertheless, there are natural connections between 
several of the described strategy classes and equilibrium behavior, and in that case we will discuss these connections in 
detail.
In the discussion, we will brieﬂy review the previous development, and in particular the relevant ﬁndings in evolutionary 
game theory (Stewart and Plotkin, 2012, 2013, 2014; Adami and Hintze, 2013; Hilbe et al., 2013a, 2013b; Akin, 2013; 
Szolnoki and Perc, 2014a, 2014b; Wu and Rong, 2014). In a nutshell, these ﬁndings say that in the context of populations 
of adapting players, partner strategies do well, whereas competitive strategies fare poorly.
2. A fundamental lemma on mean distributions
We consider the standard setup of an IPD with perfect monitoring. In each round, the two players choose whether 
to cooperate or to defect. That is, they choose an action from their respective action set Ai = {C, D}, with i ∈ {I, II}. The 
1 Whereas this additional constraint is rather uncommon in economics, it is fairly common in psychology and in the evolutionary game theory literature 
(e.g., Rapoport and Chammah, 1965; Axelrod, 1984). Inequality (2) rules out some additional complications that arise when players need to coordinate on 
different actions to obtain the social optimum. The diﬃculties become more apparent in the repeated game. As part of our analysis, we wish to characterize 
strategies which only depend on the decisions of the last round (so-called memory-one strategies), and which enforce a fair and eﬃcient outcome (which 
will be referred to as partner strategies). When 2R < T + S , eﬃciency requires players to alternate between cooperation and defection, and to establish an 
equilibrium path (CD, DC, CD, DC, . . . ). Now problems can arise when players observe a round with mutual defection, since a memory-one player is unable 
to determine who of the two players deviated from the equilibrium path (or in which stage of a possible punishment phase the players are). These issues 
can be circumvented when players are allowed to have longer memory (Mailath and Olszewski, 2011), or when the action space is rich (e.g., when the 
action space is a convex set, see Barlo et al., 2009). Herein, we will neglect these additional complications by focusing on games that satisfy the constraint 
(2). However, we note that inequality (2) is only used in proofs of results pertaining to partner strategies (Lemma 2 and Proposition 1). All other results 
presented in this manuscript (Lemma 1 and the Propositions 2–6) are independent of this condition.
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observe the chosen action proﬁle, and they receive the respective payoffs as speciﬁed in the payoff matrix (1). The round 
t history is a vector ht = (a0, a1, . . . , at−1) ∈ At , and the set of possible histories is the union H = ∪∞t=0At , with the initial 
history A0 being deﬁned as the null set A0 = {∅}. A strategy for player i is a rule that tells the player how to act after any 
possible history; that is, a strategy is a map σi :H→ (Ai), where (Ai) denotes the set of probability distributions over 
the action set Ai .2
For given strategies of the two players, let va(t) denote the probability that the resulting action proﬁle played in round 
t is a ∈ {CC, CD, DC, DD}. For convenience, we use the following vector notation:
v(t) = (vCC(t), vCD(t), vDC(t), vDD(t))
gI =
(
R, S, T , P
)
gII =
(
R, T , S, P
)
(3)
Using this notation, we can write the players’ expected payoffs in round t as πI (t) = gI · v(t) and πII(t) = gII · v(t). For a 
discount factor δ < 1, the expected payoffs of the repeated game can then be deﬁned by the Abelian means
πI = (1− δ)
∞∑
t=0
δtπI (t) = gI · v, (4)
and similarly πII = gII · v, where v =
(
vCC, vCD, vDC, vDD
)
refers to the (Abelian) mean distribution
v= (1− δ)
∞∑
t=0
δtv(t). (5)
In the limiting case δ = 1, the payoff per round is given by the Cesaro mean
πI = lim
τ→∞
1
τ + 1
τ∑
t=0
πI (t) (6)
(if this limit exists), and a similar expression for πII .3 A theorem by Frobenius states that if the Cesaro mean exists, it is the 
limit of the Abelian mean, for δ ↗ 1.
In the following, we will sometimes focus on players who only take the decisions in the previous round into account.
Deﬁnition 1. A strategy σ is a memory-one strategy if σ(ht) = σ(h˜t′ ) for all histories ht = (a0, . . . , at−1) and h˜t′ =
(a˜0, . . . , ˜at
′−1) with t, t′ ≥ 1 and at−1 = a˜t′−1.
For rounds t ≥ 1, the move of a memory-one player is therefore solely determined by the action proﬁle played in the 
previous round (in particular, we note that such players do not condition their behavior on the round number, as sometimes 
considered in models of bounded recall, e.g. Mailath and Olszewski, 2011). Such memory-one strategies can be written 
as a 5-tuple p = (pCC, pCD, pDC, pDD; p0). The element p0 denotes the probability to cooperate in the initial round. The 
continuation vector p˜ := (pCC, pCD, pDC, pDD) denotes the conditional probabilities to cooperate in rounds t ≥ 1, depending 
on the outcome of the previous round (slightly abusing notation, we let the ﬁrst letter in the subscript refer to the player’s 
own action in the previous round, and the second letter to the co-player’s action. Using this convention, we ensure that the 
interpretation of a memory-one strategy does not depend on whether the player acts as player I or as player II, see Nowak 
and Sigmund, 1995). Examples of memory-one strategies include AllD = (0, 0, 0, 0; 0), Tit For Tat (1, 0, 1, 0; 1), or Win-Stay, 
Lose-Shift (1, 0, 0, 1; 1), see Sigmund (2010) for a comprehensive discussion.
When both players apply a memory-one strategy, the resulting mean distribution v can be calculated explicitly (Nowak 
and Sigmund, 1995): if player I uses the memory-one strategy p = (pCC, pCD, pDC, pDD; p0) against a player II with memory-
one strategy q = (qCC, qCD, qDC, qDD; q0), then
v= (1− δ)v(0) · (I4 − δM)−1, (7)
where v(0) = (p0q0, p0(1 − q0), (1 − p0)q0, (1 − p0)(1 − q0)) is the initial distribution, I4 is the 4 × 4 identity matrix, and 
M is the transition matrix of the Markov chain,
2 Strictly speaking, this means that we are considering behavior strategies, see Section 2.1.3 of Mailath and Samuelson (2006).
3 This deﬁnition of payoffs for δ = 1 is common in evolutionary game theory (e.g. Sigmund, 2010), whereas the equilibrium literature usually takes the 
lim inf of average payoffs to ensure that payoffs are always deﬁned. Obviously, if the limit in (6) exists, the two deﬁnitions coincide. In the evolutionary 
literature, the strategy space is typically restricted (for example to memory-one strategies), which often guarantees the existence of the limit. Here, we 
have chosen the deﬁnition (6) to be consistent with the previous literature on ZD strategies in repeated games without discounting, e.g. Press and Dyson
(2012) and Akin (2013).
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⎛
⎜⎜⎝
pCCqCC pCC(1− qCC) (1− pCC)qCC (1− pCC)(1− qCC)
pCDqDC pCD(1− qDC) (1− pCD)qDC (1− pCD)(1− qDC)
pDCqCD pDC(1− qCD) (1− pDC)qCD (1− pDC)(1− qCD)
pDDqDD pDD(1− qDD) (1− pDD)qDD (1− pDD)(1− qDD)
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ . (8)
But even if only one of the players is using a memory-one strategy p, there is still a powerful relationship between p and 
the resulting mean distribution v.
Lemma 1. Suppose player I applies a memory-one strategy p, and let the strategy of player II be arbitrary, but ﬁxed.
(i) In the case with discounting (δ < 1), let v denote the mean distribution of the repeated game. Then
(δpCC − 1)vCC + (δpCD − 1)vCD + δpDCvDC + δpDDvDD = −(1− δ)p0, (9)
or in vector notation, (δp˜− g0) · v = −(1 − δ)p0 , where g0 = (1, 1, 0, 0).
(ii) In the case without discounting, we have
lim
τ→∞
1
τ + 1
τ∑
t=0
(p˜− g0) · v(t) = 0. (10)
In particular, if the Cesaro mean distribution v exists, (p˜− g0) · v = 0.
Proof. Suppose δ < 1, and let qI (t) denote the probability that player I cooperates in round t . Then qI (t) = g0 · v(t) and 
qI (t + 1) = p˜ · v(t). It follows that w(t) := δqI (t + 1) − qI (t) is given by
w(t) = (δp˜− g0) · v(t). (11)
Multiplying each w(t) by (1 − δ)δt and summing up over t = 0, . . . , τ yields
(1− δ)∑τt=0δt w(t) = (1− δ)(δqI (1) − qI (0) + δ2qI (2) − δqI (1) . . . )
= (1− δ)δτ+1qI (τ + 1) − (1− δ)qI (0) → −(1− δ)p0. (12)
On the other hand, due to Eq. (11),
(1− δ)
τ∑
t=0
δt w(t) = (1− δ)
τ∑
t=0
δt(δp˜− g0) · v(t) → (δp˜− g0) · v (13)
As both limits need to coincide, we have conﬁrmed Eq. (9). For the case without discounting, an analogous calculation as in 
Eq. (12) yields
1
τ + 1
τ∑
t=0
w(t) → 0, (14)
whereas Eq. (13) becomes
1
τ + 1
τ∑
t=0
w(t) = 1
τ + 1
τ∑
t=0
(p˜− g0) · v(t). (15)
It follows that the limit of 1τ+1
∑τ
t=0(p˜− g0). · v(t) for τ → ∞ exists and equals zero. 
It is worthwhile to stress the generality of Lemma 1: it neither makes any assumption on the strategy used by the 
co-player, nor does it depend on the speciﬁc payoff constraints of a prisoner’s dilemma. In the limiting case δ = 1, Lemma 1
allows a geometric interpretation: the mean distribution v (if it exists) is orthogonal to p˜− g0 (see Akin, 2013).
3. Partner strategies and competitive strategies
Deﬁnition 2. A player’s strategy is nice, if the player is never the ﬁrst to defect. A player’s strategy is cautious if the player 
is never the ﬁrst to cooperate.
For memory-one strategies, nice strategies fulﬁll p0 = pCC = 1, and cautious strategies p0 = pDD = 0. As an example, the 
strategy TFT (1, 0, 1, 0; 1) is nice, whereas the defector’s strategy AllD (0, 0, 0, 0; 0) is cautious.
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set of possible payoff pairs when player I adopts a strategy of the respective strategy class. The white dot represents the payoff that player I gets against 
a co-player using the same strategy.
Lemma 2. If 2R > T + S, then payoffs satisfy πI + πII ≥ 2R if and only if πI = πII = R (which for δ < 1 holds if and only if both 
players are nice). Similarly, if 2P < T + S, then πI +πII ≤ 2P if and only if πI = πII = P (which for δ < 1 is equivalent to both players 
being cautious).
Proof. Due to Eq. (4), πI + πII = (gI + gII) · v = (2R, T + S, T + S, 2P ) · v. As 2R > T + S , the inequality πI + πII ≥ 2R
implies vCC = 1. For δ < 1, this requires both players to cooperate in every round (if δ = 1, it only requires the players to 
cooperate in almost every round). Similarly, for a prisoner’s dilemma with 2P < T + S , the inequality πI +πII ≤ 2P implies 
vDD = 1. 
Deﬁnition 3.
(i) A partner strategy for player I is a nice strategy such that, irrespective of the co-player’s strategy,
πI < R ⇒ πII < R. (16)
(ii) A competitive strategy for player I is a strategy such that, irrespective of the co-player’s strategy,
πI ≥ πII. (17)
Fig. 1 gives a schematic illustration of these two strategy classes. The deﬁnition of partner strategies implies that these 
strategies are best replies to themselves, and thus they are Nash equilibria. Even more, because condition (16) is equivalent 
to (πII ≥ R) ⇒ (πI ≥ R), we can conclude due to Lemma 2 that (πII ≥ R) ⇒ (πI = πII = R). Thus, no matter which best reply 
the co-player applies, a player with a partner strategy will always obtain the mutual cooperation payoff R .
On the other hand, players with a competitive strategy always obtain at least the co-player’s payoff. It is easy to see that 
for δ < 1 a competitive strategy needs to be cautious (otherwise the focal player would be outcompeted by an AllD-player). 
In the limiting case δ = 1, competitiveness is closely related to the concept of being unbeatable, as introduced by Duersch et 
al. (2012). A strategy for player I is unbeatable, if against any co-player and for any number of rounds, the payoff differential ∑τ
t=0
(
πII(t) − πI (t)
)
is bounded from above (in particular, if the average payoffs per round converge to πI and πII , then 
πI ≥ πII).
Proposition 1. For a player I with a nice memory-one strategy p, the following are equivalent:
(i) p is a partner strategy;
(ii) If the co-player uses either AllD or the strategy (0, 1, 1, 1; 0), then πII < R;
(iii) The two inequalities B1 < 0 and B2 < 0 hold, with
B1 = δ(T − R)pDD − δ(R − P )(1− pCD) + (1− δ)(T − R)
B2 = δ(T − R)pDC − δ(R − S)(1− pCD) + (1− δ)(T − R). (18)
Proof.
(i) ⇒ (ii) Assume to the contrary that πII ≥ R . Then the deﬁnition of partner strategies implies that πI = πII = R . Since all 
players use memory-one strategies, this would require that everyone cooperates after mutual cooperation, which 
is neither true for AllD = (0, 0, 0, 0; 0) nor for the strategy (0, 1, 1, 1; 0).
(ii) ⇒ (iii) Against a player using a nice memory-one strategy p (with p0 = pCC = 1), the payoff of an AllD co-player is 
given by
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1+ δ(pDD − pCD) . (19)
We note that this payoff is also deﬁned when δ = 1, because pCD < 1 (otherwise p would satisfy p0 = pCC = pCD =
1, and player I would always cooperate. In that case, an AllD co-player would receive T > R , which is ruled out by 
(ii)). Elementary algebra yields
B1 =
(
1+ δ(pDD − pCD)
)(
πˆII − R
)
, (20)
In particular, B1 has the same sign as πˆII − R . On the other hand, if the co-player uses the strategy (0,1,1,1;0), the 
co-player’s payoff is
π˜II = (1− δ)T + δS + δ
(
(1− δ)R − S)pCD + δ(T + δR)pDC
1+ δ2(pDC − pCD) + δpDC , (21)
and
B2 =
(
1+ δ2(pDC − pCD) + δpDC
)(
π˜II − R
)
. (22)
Therefore, B2 has the same sign as π˜II − R .
(iii) ⇒ (i) Suppose that B1 < 0 and B2 < 0, and that πII ≥ R . We need to show that πII = πI = R . As πII − R = (gII − R1) · v, 
with 1 = (1, 1, 1, 1), we note that πII ≥ R is equivalent to
(T − R)vCD − (R − S)vDC − (R − P )vDD ≥ 0. (23)
Using the linear equations 1 ·v = 1 and (δp˜−g0) ·v = −(1 −δ) (Lemma 1 with p0 = pCC = 1, since the memory-one 
strategy is nice), we calculate vCD as a function of vDC and vDD:
vCD =
(
1− (1− pDC)δ)
)
vDC +
(
1− (1− pDD)δ
)
vDD
(1− pCD)δ . (24)
The denominator of vCD is positive, as B1 < 0 implies pCD < 1. Plugging (24) into (23) and multiplying both sides 
with (1 − pCD)δ shows that πII ≥ R if and only if
B2vDC + B1vDD ≥ 0, (25)
with B1 and B2 as deﬁned in (18). Thus, the assumptions B1 < 0 and B2 < 0 indicate that vDC = vDD = 0, and by 
(24) that vCD = 0. We conclude that vCC = 1, and therefore πI = πII = R , i.e., p is a partner strategy. 
For example, TFT is a partner strategy if and only if δ > T−RT−P and δ >
T−R
R−S , whereas WSLS is a partner strategy if and 
only if δ > T−RR−P and δ >
T−R
T−S , which is a sharper condition. In analogy to the deﬁnition of partner strategies, one may 
deﬁne a mild partner strategy for player I as a nice strategy such that πI ≤ R implies πII ≤ R , irrespective of the co-player’s 
strategy.4 For memory-one strategies, the characterization of mild partner strategies is analogous to the characterization of 
partner strategies (only the strict inequalities in Proposition 1 need to be replaced by weak inequalities).
Proposition 1 also provides an interesting connection to the folk theorems. The existence of an equilibrium with in-
dividually rational payoffs (πI , πII) in the IPD is typically shown by applying trigger strategies – any deviation from the 
equilibrium path is punished with relentless defection (as for example in Friedman, 1971).5 The following Corollary states 
that trigger strategies are, in some sense, the most effective means to enforce a cooperative equilibrium in the IPD.
Corollary 1. For a given prisoner’s dilemma and a given continuation probability δ, there exists a memory-one partner strategy if and 
only if the trigger strategy Grim = (1, 0, 0, 0; 1) is a partner strategy.
Proof. The two quantities B1 and B2 in Proposition 1 are minimal for pCD = pDC = pDD = 0. Thus, if there is a memory-one 
strategy that meets the inequalities B1 < 0 and B2 < 0, then the corresponding inequalities are also met by Grim. 
From Corollary 1, we may also conclude that partner strategies exist if and only if δ > T−RT−P (this condition for the 
existence of fully cooperative equilibria has been previously derived by Roth and Murnighan, 1978; Stahl, 1991).
Let us next give a characterization of competitive memory-one strategies:
4 Equivalently, one may deﬁne mild partner strategies as nice strategies such that πII > R implies πI > R . We note that if the premise was true and 
πII > R , then total payoffs would exceed 2R, which is ruled out by Lemma 2. We conclude that mild partner strategies enforce πII ≤ R . That is, mild partner 
strategies are exactly those nice strategies that support mutual cooperation in a Nash equilibrium.
5 For arbitrary stage games, trigger strategies support all outcomes that Pareto dominate a Nash equilibrium of the stage game. To support any individually 
rational outcome in a perfect equilibrium, players may have to use “stick and carrot” strategies instead, which punish deviations only for a ﬁnite number 
of rounds, see Fudenberg and Maskin (1986).
C. Hilbe et al. / Games and Economic Behavior 92 (2015) 41–52 47Fig. 2. The space of partner strategies, competitive strategies, submissive strategies and requiting strategies. Each grey block represents the set of strategies 
that fulﬁll the respective constraints in Propositions 1–4. For this representation, the continuation probability was set to δ = 2/3, using the payoff values 
in Axelrod (1984), i.e. T = 5, R = 3, P = 1, S = 0. The depicted pure strategies are: TFT = (1,0,1,0;1), Grim = (1,0,0,0;1), Win-stay lose-shift: WSLS =
(1,0,0,1;1), AllC = (1,1,1,1;1), AllD = (0,0,0,0;0) and suspicious Tit For Tat: sTFT = (1,0,1,0;0).
Proposition 2. Suppose player I applies the memory-one strategy p. Then the following are equivalent:
(i) p is competitive.
(ii) If the co-player uses either AllD or the strategy (0, 0, 0, 1; 0), then πI ≥ πII .
(iii) The entries of p satisfy p0 = pP = 0 and δ(pCD + pDC) ≤ 1.
Proof.
(i) ⇒ (ii) Follows immediately from the deﬁnition, a competitive strategy yields πI ≥ πII against any co-player.
(ii) ⇒ (iii) If player II applies AllD, then an explicit calculation of payoffs yields
πI −πII = − (T − S)
(
(1− δ)p0 + δpDD
)
1+ δ(pDD − pCD) , (26)
and thus πI ≥ πII implies p0 = pDD = 0. Similarly, if player II applies the strategy (0, 0, 0, 1; 0), we obtain (using 
p0 = pDD = 0):
πI −πII = δ
(
T − S)(1− δ(pCD + pDC))
1+ δ(1− (1+ δ)pCD + δpDC) . (27)
This is non-negative if and only if δ(pCD + pDC) ≤ 1.
(iii) ⇒ (i) By Lemma 1 and as pDD = p0 = 0,
δpDCvDC = (1− δpCC)vCC + (1− δpCD)vCD. (28)
Using the inequality δpDC ≤ 1 − δpCD , this leads to
(1− δpCD)vDC ≥ (1− δpCC)vCC + (1− δpCD)vCD, (29)
or equivalently (1 − δpCD)(vDC − vCD) ≥ (1 − δpCC)vCC . This implies vDC ≥ vCD . As a consequence, πI − πII =
(gI − gII) · v = (T − S)(vDC − vCD) ≥ 0. 
Fig. 2 shows the space of partner strategies (and the space of competitive strategies) as subsets of the nice memory-one 
strategies (cautious memory-one strategies), respectively. One can also deﬁne the dual properties, and derive the corre-
sponding characterizations: a strategy for player I is said to be submissive if payoffs always satisfy πI ≤ πII , irrespective of 
the strategy of player II; and a cautious strategy for player I is said to be requiting if πI > P implies πII > P (see Fig. 1 for 
a schematic representation of these strategy classes). The corresponding characterizations are:
Proposition 3. Suppose player I applies the memory-one strategy p. Then the following are equivalent:
(i) p is submissive;
(ii) If the co-player uses either AllC or the strategy (0, 1, 1, 1; 1), then πI ≤ πII ;
(iii) The entries of p satisfy p0 = pCC = 1 and δ(1 − pCD) + δ(1 − pDC) ≤ 1.
Proposition 4. Suppose the game payoffs satisfy 2P < T + S. Then, for a player I with a cautious memory-one strategy p, the following 
are equivalent:
(i) p is requiting;
(ii) If the co-player uses either AllC or the strategy (0, 0, 0, 1; 1), then πII > P ;
48 C. Hilbe et al. / Games and Economic Behavior 92 (2015) 41–52Fig. 3. Characteristic payoff relations for ZD strategies, equalizer strategies, extortion strategies and generous strategies. The grey-shaded area represents 
the set of feasible payoffs. In each graph, the strategy of player I was ﬁxed, whereas for the strategy of player II we sampled 1000 random memory-one 
strategies. The resulting payoffs were drawn as black dots. For general ZD-strategies, these dots are on a line (intersecting the diagonal at κ , and having slope 
χ ). Equalizer strategies have the additional property that the slope χ is zero, i.e. the payoff of co-player II is ﬁxed to κ , independent of the co-player’s 
strategy. Extortion strategies are ZD-strategies with κ = P and 0 < χ < 1, and generous strategies fulﬁll κ = R and 0 < χ < 1. For this ﬁgure, we have 
used the payoff values in Axelrod (1984), T = 5, R = 3, P = 1, S = 0, and continuation probability δ = 4/5. For the strategy of player I we have used: 
(i) ZD-strategy p = (0.85, 0.725, 0.1, 0.35; 0.1); (ii) Equalizer strategy p = (0.875, 0.375, 0.375, 0.125; 0.5); (iii) Extortion strategy p = (1, 0.125, 0.75, 0; 0); 
(iv) Generous strategy p = (1, 0.125, 0.75, 0; 1).
(iii) The two inequalities B1 > 0 and B2 > 0 hold, with
B1 = δ(R − P )pDC + δ(P − S)pCC − (P − S),
B2 = δ(T − P )pDC + δ(P − S)pCD − (P − S). (30)
4. ZD-strategies
The previous results have highlighted how Lemma 1 can be used to characterize several interesting strategy classes 
within the space of memory-one strategies (for example, the strategies that allow a player to outcompete the opponent, 
or the strategies that provide incentives to reach the social optimum). In the following, we present another application of 
Lemma 1: there are strategies with which a player can unilaterally enforce a linear relationship between the players’ payoffs.
Deﬁnition 4. A memory-one strategy p is said to be a ZD strategy if there exist constants α, β, γ such that
δp˜= αgI + βgII +
(
γ − (1− δ)p0
)
1+ g0. (31)
Proposition 5. Let δ < 1, and suppose player I applies a memory-one strategy p satisfying Eq. (31). Then, irrespective of the strategy 
of the co-player,
απI + βπII + γ = 0. (32)
The same relation holds for δ = 1, provided that the payoffs πI and πII exist.6
Proof. This follows directly from Lemma 1, using the identities πI = gI · v, πII = gII · v, and 1 = 1 · v. 
In the following, let δ < 1. We proceed with a slightly different representation of ZD strategies, using the parameter 
transformation α = φχ , β = −φ, and γ = φκ(1 − χ).7 Under this transformation, ZD strategies take the form
δp˜ = φ
[
(1−χ)(κ1− gI) + (gI − gII)
]
− (1− δ)p01+ g0, (33)
and the enforced payoff relationship according to (32) becomes
πII − κ = χ(πI − κ). (34)
6 If δ = 1, and the payoffs πI and πII according to Eq. (6) do not exist, one can derive a slightly weaker result. In that case, it follows from Eq. (10) that
lim
τ→∞
1
τ + 1
τ∑
t=0
(
απI (t) + βπII(t) + γ
)= 0.
7 For δ < 1, the proof of Proposition 6 shows that ZD strategies require φ > 0 and χ < 1 (and hence β < 0 and α + β < 0). This allows us to conclude 
that the given parameter transformation is in fact bijective: the inverse is given by χ = −α/β , φ = −β , and κ = −γ /(α + β).
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strategy against itself) and having a slope χ (see Fig. 3).
Players cannot use ZD strategies to enforce arbitrary payoff relationships of the form (34): since the entries of the 
continuation vector p˜ correspond to conditional probabilities (and hence need to be in the unit interval), the parameters κ , 
χ and φ need to obey certain restrictions. This gives rise to the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 5. For a given δ, we call a payoff relationship (κ, χ) ∈ R2 enforceable if there are φ ∈ R and p0 ∈ [0, 1] such 
that each entry of the continuation vector p˜ according to Eq. (33) is in [0,1]. We refer to the set of all enforceable payoff 
relationships as Eδ .
Proposition 6.
(i) The set of enforceable payoff relationships is monotonically increasing in the discount factor: if δ′ ≤ δ′′ , then Eδ′ ⊆ Eδ′′ .
(ii) There is a δ < 1 such that (κ, χ) ∈ Eδ if and only if −1 < χ < 1 and
max
{
P ,
S − Tχ
1−χ
}
≤ κ ≤min
{
R,
T − Sχ
1−χ
}
, (35)
with at least one inequality in (35) being strict.
Proof.
(i) According to the deﬁnition, (κ, χ) ∈ Eδ if and only if one can ﬁnd φ ∈ R and p0 ∈ [0, 1], such that the corresponding 
continuation vector p˜ according to Eq. (33) satisﬁes 0 ≤ δp˜≤ δ1, or equivalently,
(1− δ)(1− p0) ≤ φ(1− χ)(R − κ) ≤ 1− (1− δ)p0 (36a)
(1− δ)(1− p0) ≤ φ
[
(1−χ)(S − κ) + T − S]≤ 1− (1− δ)p0 (36b)
(1− δ)p0 ≤ φ
[
(1−χ)(κ − T ) + T − S]≤ δ + (1− δ)p0 (36c)
(1− δ)p0 ≤ φ(1− χ)(κ − P ) ≤ δ + (1− δ)p0 (36d)
We note that in (36a)–(36d), the left hand side is monotonically decreasing in δ, whereas the right hand side is mono-
tonically increasing in δ. In particular, if the conditions (36) are satisﬁed for some δ′ ≤ 1 they are also satisﬁed for any 
δ′′ ≥ δ′ .
(ii) (⇒) Suppose (κ, χ) ∈ Eδ , and therefore the conditions (36) hold for appropriate parameters φ and p0. Summing up the 
ﬁrst inequality in (36a) and the ﬁrst inequality in (36d) shows
1− δ ≤ φ(1− χ)(R − P ). (37)
Similarly, by taking the inequalities in (36b) and (36c), we get
1− δ ≤ φ(1+ χ)(T − S). (38)
In particular, 0 < φ(1 − χ) and 0 < φ(1 + χ), and therefore φ > 0 and −1 < χ < 1. Moreover, the conditions (36)
imply
0≤ φ(1− χ)(R − κ)
0≤ φ[(1−χ)(S − κ) + T − S]
0≤ φ[(1−χ)(κ − T ) + T − S]
0≤ φ(1− χ)(κ − P ). (39)
Since φ > 0 and χ < 1, these conditions are equivalent to condition (35). If none of the inequalities in (35) was 
strict, then (36a) or (36b) would require p0 = 1, whereas (36c) or (36d) would require p0 = 0.
(⇐) Conversely, let −1 < χ < 1, and suppose max
{
P , S−Tχ1−χ
}
≤ κ <min
{
R, T−Sχ1−χ
}
. Then the inequalities (39) hold for 
any choice of φ > 0, with the ﬁrst two inequalities being strict. In particular, we can choose a φ suﬃciently small 
such that each term on the right hand’s side of (39) is bounded from above by 1/2. By setting p0 = 0 and choosing 
a δ suﬃciently close to one, it thus follows that all inequalities in (36) can be satisﬁed. An analogous argument 
holds when κ = min
{
R, T−Sχ
}
, in which case one needs to set p0 = 1. 1−χ
50 C. Hilbe et al. / Games and Economic Behavior 92 (2015) 41–52Fig. 4. Enforceable payoff relationships for players with a ZD strategy. The grey area depicts all pairs (κ, χ ) that are enforceable when the discount factor 
δ is suﬃciently close to one, as characterized in Proposition 6. The graph also depicts some particular subclasses of ZD strategies: equalizer strategies 
(χ = 0), extortion strategies (κ = P , χ > 0), and generous strategies (κ = R , χ > 0). The so-called fair strategies (with χ = 1) do only exist in the limit of 
no discounting, δ = 1. For the illustration, we have taken the payoff values in Axelrod (1984), i.e. T = 5, R = 3, P = 1, S = 0.
The ﬁrst part of Proposition 6 shows that a given linear payoff relationship of the form (34) is easier to enforce when 
players are suﬃciently patient. As δ → 1, the limiting set of enforceable payoff relationships (κ, χ ) is characterized by 
Proposition 6(ii); Fig. 4 provides an illustration.
There are various remarkable subclasses of ZD strategies (as depicted in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4). For χ = 0, we encounter 
so-called equalizer strategies (see Boerlijst et al., 1997; Press and Dyson, 2012). By Eq. (34), player I can make use of such 
strategies to prescribe κ as payoff for player II. A player can thus determine the opponent’s payoff (however, player I
cannot ﬁx the own payoff, since this would require χ to be unbounded, which is ruled out by Proposition 6). Press and 
Dyson (2012) also highlighted the class of extortion strategies (with κ = P and 0 < χ < 1). Extortion strategies guarantee 
that the own ‘surplus’ over the minimax payoff P exceeds the opponent’s surplus by a factor of χ−1. Moreover, since χ > 0, 
the payoffs of the two players are positively related. Hence, to maximize the own payoff, player II needs to maximize player 
I ’s payoff: the best response against an extortioner is to cooperate unconditionally. As a counterpart to extortioners, Stewart 
and Plotkin (2012) deﬁned the class of generous strategies, which satisfy Eq. (34) with κ = R and 0 < χ < 1. Players using 
a generous strategy shoulder a larger burden of the loss (with respect to the social optimum R) than their co-player. Since 
χ > 0, they also ensure that the payoffs of the two players are aligned, thereby motivating the co-player to cooperate. 
Finally, for games without discounting it was noted that strategies with χ = 1 enforce πI = πII (for δ = 1, TFT is an example 
of such a fair strategy, see Press and Dyson, 2012; Hilbe et al., 2014b). However, as Proposition 6 shows, fair strategies cease 
to exist when future payoffs are discounted, and only approximately fair strategies (with χ close to one) may be feasible.
ZD strategies can also be connected to the strategy classes discussed in the previous section. Generous strategies, for 
example, are exactly the ZD strategies which are submissive partner strategies (in particular it follows that every generous 
strategy is a Nash equilibrium of the IPD). On the other hand, for stage games with 2P < T + S (which ensures πI +πII ≥ 2P ), 
extortion strategies are precisely those ZD strategies which are requiting and competitive.
We note that herein, we have entirely focused on the repeated prisoner’s dilemma, due to the central role that this 
simple game situation takes in the literature on the evolution of cooperation (Rapoport and Chammah, 1965; Trivers, 1971;
Sugden, 1986; Axelrod, 1984; Sigmund, 2010). However, the proofs of Lemma 1 and Proposition 5 did not require any 
assumptions on the payoff values (and in the proof of Proposition 6, we have only made use of the assumptions R > P
and T > S). Moreover, for δ = 1, it was recently shown that similar results can also be obtained for stage games with 2 
actions but n ≥ 2 players (Hilbe et al., 2014b). Thus, while we believe that our results are most intuitive in the context of a 
prisoner’s dilemma, the mathematics can be extended to more general strategic situations.
5. Discussion
The recent development began with the paper of Press and Dyson (2012) introducing ZD strategies for repeated 
games without discounting. In this context, Press and Dyson derived the linear relation (32). Their proof was based 
on a neat formula for the payoffs achieved if both players use memory-one strategies. This formula only involves van-
ishing determinants, which explains the name ZD. Press and Dyson highlighted those ZD strategies that ﬁx the co-
player’s payoff to a given value between P and R , as well as the sinister properties of extortion strategies. They 
also stressed the fact that more complex strategies (based on larger memories, for instance) are not able to proﬁt 
from their sophistication to gain the upper hand. The intriguing aspects of ZD strategies raised considerable atten-
tion (see, e.g., Ball, 2012). In the News section of the American Mathematical Society, it was stated that ’the world 
of game theory is currently on ﬁre.’ A more skeptical view could be found among economists. The well-known folk 
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off pair above the minimax level P , by threatening to switch to relentless defection otherwise (see Aumann, 1981;
Kalai, 1990; Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986, 1990). Seen from this angle, the progress consisted merely in displaying memory-
one strategies with a similar power to enforce speciﬁc payoff pairs. However, there is a subtle difference: whereas the Folk 
theorems are based on the assumption that players wish to maximize their payoffs, the results presented herein are in-
dependent of such an assumption. Interpreted in this way, we have explored how much control player I can exert on the 
resulting payoffs without being sure about the motives of player II.
Memory-one strategies able to ﬁx the co-player’s payoff had already been derived in Boerlijst et al. (1997) and Sigmund
(2010), based on an approach different from that of Press and Dyson (2012). This method was used in Hilbe et al. (2013a)
to provide another derivation of (32), not involving any determinants. It was substantially extended by Akin (2013) to yield 
a general equation for the mean distribution of memory-one strategies when δ = 1. In this case, the mean distribution is 
understood in the sense of Cesaro, and need not always exist. In Lemma 1, we have extended this approach to cover the 
case δ < 1, from which Akin’s result for δ = 1 immediately follows. Lemma 1 offers a geometric tool for the investigation 
of memory-one strategies. The vector δp˜ consists of the conditional probabilities to play C in the next round (δ is the 
probability that there is a next round), whereas g0 can be viewed as ’conditional probability’ to play C in the current round. 
In the limit of no discounting, Lemma 1 states that no matter which strategy player II is using, the limiting distribution v
(if it exists) is on a hyperplane orthogonal to the difference of these two conditional probabilities. It was also Akin (2013)
who extended the investigations beyond the case of ZD-strategies, to characterize partner strategies for δ = 1 (calling them 
’good’ strategies, a term we feel is too general).
In a comments article, Stewart and Plotkin (2012) introduced an example of a generous strategy, and showed that 
in a round robin tournament conducted after the fashion of Axelrod (1984), this generous strategy emerged as winner. 
Stewart and Plotkin also asked whether ZD strategies were relevant for evolutionary game theory. In this context, one 
considers a population of players, each equipped with a strategy. The players are then allowed to imitate other strategies, 
preferentially those with a higher payoff (see, e.g., Weibull, 1995; Samuelson, 1997; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Nowak, 
2006; Sandholm, 2010).
It is obvious that extortion strategies cannot spread too much in such an evolutionary context; if they become too 
common, they are likely to encounter their own, which bides ill. If player I obtains twice the surplus of II, and II twice 
the surplus of I , each surplus is zero. However, Hilbe et al. (2013a) showed that extortion strategies can pave the way for 
the emergence of cooperative strategies, similar to TFT (which, for δ = 1, can be regarded as a limiting case of an extortion 
strategy, Press and Dyson, 2012). This catalytic role of extortion strategies has also been conﬁrmed for games on networks, 
in which players only interact within a small neighborhood (Szolnoki and Perc, 2014a, 2014b; Wu and Rong, 2014). Overall, 
these studies conﬁrm that extortionate strategies have problems to succeed within a population. However, if the games 
are played between members of two distinct populations – for instance, between hosts organisms and their symbionts 
– then extortion strategies can emerge in whichever population is slower to adapt (Hilbe et al., 2013a). The slower rate 
of evolution acts as a commitment device. In effect, the slowly evolving organism becomes the Stackelberg leader in a 
sequential game, in which the slow player learns to adopt extortion strategies, whereas the faster evolving player learns 
to play the best response, and to cooperate unconditionally (Bergstrom and Lachmann, 2003; Damore and Gore, 2011;
Gokhale and Traulsen, 2012).
But even in a one-population setup, certain ZD strategies prove successful: Stewart and Plotkin showed that evolutionary 
trajectories often visit the vicinity of generous strategies. The dynamics leads ‘from extortion to generosity’ (the title of 
Stewart and Plotkin, 2013). This is also conﬁrmed, by analytical means based on adaptive dynamics, by Hilbe et al. (2013b). 
Remarkably, Stewart and Plotkin (2013, 2014) derived a characterization of all memory-one strategies which are robust in 
an evolutionary sense, for given population size N . This means that the replacement probability, as a resident strategy, 
is at most 1/N (which is the probability to be replaced if the mutant is neutral). In the limit of weak selection, which 
roughly means that the choice between two strategies is only marginally inﬂuenced by payoff (see Nowak et al., 2004), all 
robust ZD strategies need to be generous (Stewart and Plotkin, 2013). These predictions have also been tested in a recent 
behavior experiment, in which human subjects played against various computer opponents (Hilbe et al., 2014a). Although 
extortionate programs outcompeted their human co-players in every game, generous programs received, on average, higher 
payoffs against the human subjects than extortionate programs. Humans were hesitant to give in to extortion; although 
unconditional cooperation would have been their best response in all treatments, they only became more cooperative over 
time if their co-player was generous.
Intriguingly, if a player uses a generous strategy and the co-player does not go along, then the focal player will always 
shoulder a larger part of the loss (with respect to the mutual cooperation payoff R). Despite their forbearance, generous 
strategies do very well – which is not the least of the surprises offered by the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
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